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Is Prudential Standing 
Jurisdictional? 
Bradford C. Mank†  
Abstract  
The Supreme Court has clearly treated the Constitution’s 
Article III standing requirements as mandatory jurisdictional hurdles 
that a plaintiff must meet for each form of relief sought before federal 
courts may consider the merits of a case. But the Supreme Court has 
never squarely held that prudential standing is a jurisdictional issue 
that must be decided before the merits in every single case. A 1975 
Supreme Court decision suggested in dicta that prudential standing 
doctrine plays a crucial role in preventing federal courts from 
addressing political questions, but a 1984 Court decision implied in 
dicta that prudential standing is less important than Article III 
constitutional standing. In light of the Court’s conflicting dicta about 
the importance of prudential standing doctrine, it is not surprising 
that lower federal courts have split over whether prudential standing 
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45221-0040; Telephone (513) 556-0094, Fax (513) 556-1236, E-mail 
brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank Michael Solimine for his comments on an 
earlier draft. All errors or omissions are my responsibility. This Article 
is one of a series of explorations of modern standing doctrines. The other 
pieces are: (1) Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than 
Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for 
States, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1701 (2008); (2) Standing and Future 
Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for 
Generations to Come?, 34 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, (2009); (3) Standing 
and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 
36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665 (2009): (4) Summers v. Earth Island Institute 
Rejects Probabilistic Standing, but a “Realistic Threat” of Harm is a 
Better Standing Test, 40 Envtl. L. 89 (2010); (5) Revisiting the Lyons 
Den: Summers v. Earth Island Institute’s Misuse of Lyons’s “Realistic 
Threat” of Harm Standing Test, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 837 (2010); 
(6) Summers v. Earth Island Institute: Its Implications for Future 
Standing Decisions, 40 Envtl. L. Rep., 10958 (2010); (7) Standing in 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms: Using Economic Injury as a 
Basis for Standing When Environmental Harm Is Difficult to Prove, 
115 Penn St. L. Rev. 307 (2010); (8) Informational Standing After 
Summers, 39 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1 (2012); (9) Reading the 
Standing Tea Leaves in American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 46 U. 
Rich. L. Rev. 543 (2012); (10) Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of 
Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer’s Approach to Standing than to 
Justice Scalia’s, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 71 (2012); and (11) Standing for 
Private Parties in Global Warming Cases: Traceable Standing 
Causation Does Not Require Proximate Causation, 2012 Mich. St. L. 
Rev. 869 (2012). 
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requirements are jurisdictional or whether such barriers may be 
waived if a party fails to raise the issue. 
This Article generally agrees with recent judicial arguments that 
prudential standing should not be treated as a jurisdictional issue. 
The greatest weakness of these arguments is that, although they 
relied in part on the Supreme Court’s recent trend to narrow the 
issues considered jurisdictional, they did not address why the Court 
has engaged in such a trend. This Article attempts to supplement 
these arguments by examining the adversarial traditions that underlie 
the Anglo-American legal system. It further explains that the 
argument for limiting the scope of jurisdictional rules would have 
been more convincing if it also pointed out that judges’ sua sponte 
jurisdictional decisions are generally contrary to the Anglo-American 
legal system’s party-controlled adversarial model of legal decision 
making and, as a result, should only be mandated where absolutely 
necessary. Indeed, the Court itself has referenced the adversarial 
model in relation to jurisdictionality, noting that “[b]randing a rule as 
going to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction alters the normal 
operation of our adversarial system.”  
After considering various Court dicta on the relationship between 
prudential and Article III standing, this Article concludes that 
prudential standing is not so closely entwined with Article III 
jurisdiction to require an exception to our adversarial traditions of 
party autonomy in a free society. Furthermore, this Article maintains 
that where jurisdictionality is a close question, courts should give 
significant weight to the impact of mandatory sua sponte 
jurisdictional decisions on the fundamental principle of adversarial 
party control. 
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Introduction 
The Supreme Court has clearly treated the Constitution’s 
Article III standing requirements as mandatory jurisdictional hurdles 
that a plaintiff must meet for each form of relief sought before a 
federal court may consider the merits of a case.1 A federal court must 
dismiss a case without deciding the merits if the plaintiff fails to meet 
the constitutional standing test, and a court must raise the issue of 
 
1. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 
(2000) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form 
of relief sought.”). See generally Bradford Mank, Should States Have 
Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. 
EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1701, 
1709–10 (2008) (providing a brief overview of constitutional standing).  
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Article III standing sua sponte if the parties fail to do so.2 Indeed, in 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,3 the Supreme Court 
rejected the “‘doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction,’” which was 
employed by some lower courts and described as “‘assuming’ 
jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits.”4  
As examined in Part I.B, whether the Supreme Court’s judge-
made prudential standing rules5 are jurisdictional is much less clear.6 
The Court has never squarely held that prudential standing is a 
jurisdictional issue that must be decided before the merits in every 
single case.7 Part I.C follows by discussing the conflicting Supreme 
Court dicta on the issue: first, a 1975 decision that suggested 
prudential standing doctrine plays a crucial role in preventing federal 
courts from addressing political questions and second, a 1984 decision 
that implied prudential standing is less important than Article III 
 
2. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 (“[W]e have an obligation to assure 
ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the outset of the 
litigation.”); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (labeling 
Article III standing as a “threshold question in every federal case”). 
3.  523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
4. Id. at 93–94 (quoting United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934 n.1 
(9th Cir. 1996)); see also Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid 
Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (observing that the 
Supreme Court in Steel Co. rejected the practice of deciding merits 
before resolving Article III standing).  
5. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (discussing 
the nature and definition of prudential standing requirements). 
6. See Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of 
Standing, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1241, 1266 (2011) (noting the 
disagreement among the federal circuits on this issue). 
7. The Supreme Court has stated that it may decide ripeness questions sua 
sponte, even if the questions are prudential. Reno v. Catholic Soc. 
Servs., Inc., 509 US 43, 57 n.18 (1993) (“Even when a ripeness question 
in a particular case is prudential, we may raise it on our own motion, 
and ‘cannot be bound by the wishes of the parties.’” (quoting Reg’l Rail 
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974))); see also Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2 
(2010) (allowing parties to waive prudential ripeness issue but stating, 
“We express no view as to whether, in a similar case, a federal court 
may consider a question of prudential ripeness on its own motion.”). But 
the Supreme Court has never clearly addressed whether all prudential 
standing issues are jurisdictional. See Meier, supra note 6, at 1266 n.155 
(providing examples of when the Supreme Court has been “ambiguous” 
with regard to prudential standing requirements); see also Micah J. 
Revell, Comment, Prudential Standing, the Zone of Interests, and the 
New Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 63 Emory L.J. 221, 252–59 (2013) 
(arguing that recent Supreme Court cases imply that prudential 
standing is nonjurisdictional but acknowledging that the Court has not 
squarely addressed the issue). 
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constitutional standing. In light of the Court’s conflicting direction 
about the definition, application, and importance of prudential 
standing doctrine, it is not surprising that lower federal courts have 
split over whether prudential standing requirements are jurisdictional 
or whether such barriers may be waived if a party fails to raise the 
issue, although six circuits since 1999 have held that prudential 
standing is nonjurisdictional.8 
Part III discusses Supreme Court and circuit court precedents 
invoked by recent judicial arguments regarding the jurisdictionality of 
prudential standing, including the recent trend by the Supreme Court 
to narrow the issues considered jurisdictional. This Article generally 
agrees that prudential standing should not be treated as a 
jurisdictional issue. But the greatest weakness of the judicial 
arguments is that they did not thoroughly address why the Court has 
sought to narrow the range of jurisdictional issues. While the Supreme 
Court has clearly sought to narrow which issues are jurisdictional, 
that trend alone does not resolve the jurisdictionality of prudential 
standing. 
The traditional approach to resolving whether prudential standing 
is jurisdictional involves examining the separation of powers principles 
that lie at the heart of standing doctrine.9 Part IV of this Article will 
examine a possible separation of powers argument for treating 
prudential standing as nonjurisdictional. There is a plausible 
argument that the executive branch should be able to deliberately 
waive prudential standing barriers in some cases, but there are also 
concerns that executive waivers might in some cases be contrary to 
congressional intent and that judicial line drawing would be difficult.10 
A comparative law perspective can help to address the core values 
behind whether prudential standing should be jurisdictional and why 
 
8. See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 181–90 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that prudential standing should not 
be jurisdictional, observing that six circuits since 1999 have held that 
prudential standing is nonjurisdictional, and discussing the trend in the 
circuit courts to treat the issue as nonjurisdictional), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 2880 (2013). Other commentators have also noted this discrepancy 
among the courts. Meier, supra note 6, at 1266 n.156 (citing cases); 
Revell, supra note 7, at 224 n.16 (“The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have all held that prudential standing is 
not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver. The Second, Sixth, and D.C. 
Circuits have held to the contrary.” (citations omitted)).  
9. See Recent Case, Federal Civil Procedure—Standing—D.C. Circuit 
Raises Prudential Standing Sua Sponte to Dismiss Regulator Challenge 
on Jurisdictional Grounds—Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, 
693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, No. 10-1380 
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 2013), 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1446, 1449–51 (2013) 
[hereinafter Recent Case] (summarizing judicial approaches to standing). 
10. See id. at 1451–53. 
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the court may have moved toward limiting the use of the 
jurisdictional label. Thus, Part V examines the adversarial traditions 
that underlie the Anglo-American legal system. Part V.D explains 
that the judicial arguments for limiting the scope of jurisdictional 
rules would have been more convincing had they also pointed out that 
judges’ sua sponte jurisdictional decisions are generally contrary to 
the Anglo-American legal system’s party-controlled adversarial model 
of legal decision making and should therefore only be mandated when 
absolutely necessary. This contention is supported by the Court’s best 
explanation for making a sharp distinction between jurisdictional and 
nonjurisdictional rules, which invokes the traditional adversarial 
model and states that “[b]randing a rule as going to a court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction alters the normal operation of our adversarial 
system.”11 
To summarize, this Article proceeds as follows. Parts I.A and I.B 
discuss the separate doctrines of constitutional Article III standing 
and prudential standing. Part I.C then examines conflicting Supreme 
Court dicta on whether prudential standing is as important as 
constitutional Article III standing. Part II follows by examining why 
some issues are jurisdictional and the impact of such a label. Part III 
discusses the precedential support invoked by recent judicial 
arguments regarding the jurisdictionality of prudential standing.  
Part IV addresses a separation of powers argument for allowing the 
executive branch to waive prudential standing barriers, but it raises 
the concerns that such waivers can be contrary to congressional intent 
and that judicial line drawing between appropriate and inappropriate 
waivers would be difficult. Part V concludes by discussing the 
distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems and 
argues that prudential standing should be treated as a 
nonjurisdictional issue that may be waived if the parties choose not to 
raise the topic. Finally, while the definition of prudential standing 
may be in flux after the Court’s recent ruling in Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,12 this Article 
maintains that where jurisdictionality is a close question, courts 
should give significant weight to the impact of mandatory sua sponte 
jurisdictional decisions on the fundamental principle of adversarial 
party control. 
 
11. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
12. No. 12-873 (2014); see supra Part I.B.  
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I. Standing Basics 
A. Constitutional Standing 
The Constitution does not explicitly require that a plaintiff 
possess “standing” to file suit in federal courts.13 Since 1944, however, 
the Supreme Court has inferred from the Constitution’s Article III 
limitation of judicial decisions to “Cases” and “Controversies” that 
federal courts must utilize standing requirements to guarantee that 
the plaintiff has a genuine interest and stake in a case.14 Thus, federal 
courts have jurisdiction over a case only if at least one plaintiff can 
prove standing for each form of relief sought,15 and a federal court 
must dismiss a case without deciding the merits if the plaintiff fails to 
establish constitutional standing.16 
 
13. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution reads in part:  
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, 
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall 
be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—
between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens 
of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming 
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or 
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.  
 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
14. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (stating explicitly for the first 
time in a Supreme Court case the Article III standing requirement); 
see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 339–41 (2006) 
(explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III’s case and 
controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations); Mank, supra 
note 1, at 1709–10 (providing an overview of Article III standing, 
including the three standing requirements). But see Am. Bottom 
Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652, 655–56 
(7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (questioning whether standing is based on 
Article III requirements and citing academic literature); Michael E. 
Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 1023, 1036–38 (2009) (discussing the debate about whether 
the Constitution implicitly requires standing to sue). 
15. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351–54 (“[O]ur standing cases confirm that 
a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to 
press.”); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing 
separately for each form of relief sought.”). 
16. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340–42 (propounding that plaintiffs 
must “carry the burden of establishing their standing under 
Article III”); Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 (“[W]e have an 
obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing 
at the outset of the litigation.”). 
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By “‘enforc[ing] the Constitution’s case-or-controversy 
requirement,’” Article III standing supports two broader 
constitutional principles.17 First, standing prevents courts from issuing 
advisory opinions.18 Furthermore, standing requirements support 
separation of powers principles, defining the division between the 
judiciary and political branches so “that the Federal Judiciary 
respects ‘the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a 
democratic society.’”19 There is disagreement, however, regarding the 
extent to which the separation of powers principles limit Congress’s 
power to authorize standing for private citizens to sue in federal 
courts and challenge alleged executive branch under- or 
nonenforcement of statutory requirements mandated by Congress.20 
For constitutional standing, the Court uses a three-part test, 
requiring a plaintiff to show: (1) she has “suffered an ‘injury in fact,’” 
which is (a) “concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of” such that the 
injury is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some 
third party not before the court”; and (3) “likel[ihood], as opposed to 
mere[ ] speculat[ion], that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.”21 A plaintiff has the burden of establishing all three prongs 
of the standing test.22  
 
17. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004)). 
18. See id. (requiring plaintiffs to establish Article III standing and thereby 
demonstrate that the constitutional law question raised is “presented in 
a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’”); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) 
(discussing the injury in fact requirement and noting that harm of an 
abstract nature “prevents a plaintiff from obtaining what would, in 
effect, amount to an advisory opinion”). 
19. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). 
20. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–78 (1992) 
(concluding, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, that Article III 
and Article II of the Constitution limit Congressional authority to 
authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete injury), with id. 
at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “principal effect” of 
the majority opinion’s restrictive approach to standing was “to transfer 
power into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the 
Courts—but of Congress, from which that power originates and 
emanates”), and Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 Stan. 
L. Rev. 459, 496 (2008) (arguing that courts should not use standing 
doctrine “as a backdoor way to limit Congress’s legislative power”). 
21. Lujan, 504 U.S at 560–61 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
22. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; Larry W. 
Yackle, Federal Courts 336 (3d ed. 2009). 
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B. The Uncertainties of Prudential Standing 
In addition to constitutional Article III standing requirements, 
federal courts may impose prudential standing requirements to limit 
unreasonable demands on limited judicial resources or for other 
judicial policy reasons.23 To inform whether prudential standing 
should be jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional, this Part explores the 
Court’s historical and recent treatment of prudential standing and 
highlights some of the remaining questions and ambiguities. 
Specifically, this Part addresses disagreement on the Court regarding 
how to define and apply the principles, where to draw the line 
between prudential and Article III standing requirements, and 
whether prudential standing should even exist. The Supreme Court’s 
prudential standing doctrine is arguably even less defined and more 
open to interpretation than its constitutional standing doctrine.24 
Thus, the uncertainty surrounding the requirements and application 
of prudential standing doctrine support the argument that prudential 
standing should be treated differently than Article III standing, that 
is, as nonjurisdictional. 
Regarding the definition of prudential standing, the Court 
recently clarified some aspects while placing others, and the future 
definition of prudential standing, in flux. In Elk Grove Unified School 
District v. Newdow,25 the Supreme Court explained that prudential 
standing has not been “exhaustively defined.”26 And up until recently 
the doctrine included at least three components: (1) “‘the general 
prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights,’” 
(2) “‘the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more 
appropriately addressed in the representative branches,’” and 
(3) “‘the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone 
of interests protected by the law invoked.’”27 But with Lexmark 
 
23. See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 22, at 318 (stating that prudential 
limitations are policy based “and may be relaxed in some 
circumstances”). 
24. See Gregory Bradford, Note, Simplifying State Standing: The Role of 
Sovereign Interests in Future Climate Litigation, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 
1065, 1079 (2011) (describing prudential standing doctrine as “a 
malleable framework”). 
25. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
26. Id. at 12.   
27. Id. at 12 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). Professor 
Meier has similarly summarized the Court’s previous formulation of the 
prudential standing doctrine: 
The Court has been less precise in identifying prudential 
standing requirements, but the most commonly recognized are: 
(1) the requirement that “a plaintiff’s grievance must arguably 
fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the 
statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the 
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International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,28 a unanimous 
Court disposed of two of these as outside the “rubric” of prudential 
standing: the zone of interests test29 and the ban against generalized 
grievances, which is now more properly considered a constitutional 
barrier to standing.30 While it is clear that, at least for now, the ban 
against third party standing remains within the prudential rubric,31 
the structure and definition of prudential standing barriers remains to 
be seen. Regardless of how the Court defines prudential standing, it is 
noteworthy that Congress may enact legislation to override prudential 
limitations.32  
Nevertheless, two relatively recent decisions highlight the Court’s 
disagreement regarding how to define and apply prudential standing 
principles. First, the recent United States v. Windsor33 might indicate 
that prudential standing includes the requirement that the parties are 
truly adverse in their positions,34 but the majority’s treatment of the 
issue was harshly criticized by the dissent as one of convenience.35 
Windsor involved a challenge to section 3 of the Defense of Marriage 
Act36 (DOMA), which excluded same-sex marriage partners from 
numerous federal laws otherwise applicable to lawfully married 
 
suit,” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); (2) the 
requirement that a plaintiff “must assert his own legal rights and 
interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or 
interests of third parties,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 
(1975); and (3) a prohibition against “‘generalized grievance[s]’ 
shared in a substantially equal measure by all or a large class 
citizens,” id. More recently, however, the Court has tended to 
articulate the prohibition against generalized grievances as 
deriving from Article III rather than prudential concerns.  
Meier, supra note 6, at 1243 n.4. 
28. No. 12-873 (2014).  
29. Id., slip op. at 8.   
30. Id., slip op. at 8 n.3.  
31. Id. (noting that the restrictions against third-party standing is “harder 
to classify” and declining to address the issue definitively). 
32. Keith B. Hall, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 46 Loy. L. Rev. 
101, 123 (2000) (noting Congress’s previous acts to alter limitations on 
third-party standing). 
33.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
34.  Id. at 2687.  
35. Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Relegating a jurisdictional 
requirement to ‘prudential’ status is a wondrous device, enabling courts 
to ignore the requirement whenever they believe it ‘prudent’—which is 
to say, a good idea.”). 
36. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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spouses.37 Specifically, the Court held that the United States met 
Article III standing because, despite its agreement with the lower 
court’s ruling, the United States had not refunded the money to 
which Windsor was entitled under that ruling and thus suffered an 
economic injury.38 Furthermore, the Court found it proper to allow 
arguments provided by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group 
(BLAG) supporting DOMA to satisfy the prudential concerns that 
the United States and Windsor were “friendly” parties.39  
 Second, in Newdow, the Court found standing lacking due to 
family law concerns and thus dismissed an Establishment Clause suit 
brought by an elementary school student’s father. The suit challenged 
the constitutionality of a school district’s policy requiring daily 
teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.40 The Court cited 
prudential standing concerns, stating, “[I]t is improper for federal 
courts to entertain a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is 
founded on family law rights that are in dispute when prosecution of 
the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the 
source of the plaintiff’s claimed standing.”41 The child’s mother, who 
was the custodial parent, intervened to dismiss the complaint, and 
there were complex issues based in California family law about the 
father’s right to influence his daughter’s religious upbringing.42 Thus, 
as a result of these family law issues, the majority concluded that the 
Court should prudentially avoid a case involving family law matters 
defined by California domestic relations law.43 But in his concurring 
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by Justices 
O’Connor and Thomas, complained that the majority had invented a 
novel prudential standing principle based on “ad hoc improvisations” 
to dismiss a troublesome case rather than developing “general 
principles” for the doctrine of prudential standing.44  
Additionally, the line between constitutional Article III 
standing doctrine and prudential standing doctrine is often 
unclear.45 Some commentators have argued that the Court’s 
 
37. Id. 
38. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686.   
39. Id. at 2687–88 (citing other cases where the Court has entertained 
adversarial arguments from nonparties).  
40.  Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2004). 
41. Id. at 17–18. 
42. Id. at 13–16. 
43. Id. at 16–18. 
44. Id. at 18–25 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring). 
45. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 Conn. 
L. Rev. 677, 692–94 (1990) (arguing that the Court’s distinction 
between prudential and constitutional standing is often arbitrary); 
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distinction between constitutional and prudential standing sometimes 
rests only on the Court’s arbitrary determination to classify an issue 
as constitutional or prudential for its convenience without any 
genuine logical basis.46 For example, the Court’s first major case 
denying taxpayer standing, Frothingham v. Mellon,47 established that 
an individual taxpayer generally cannot sue the government to 
challenge how tax dollars are appropriated because his generalized 
interest in government expenditures “is shared with millions of others; 
is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon 
future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, [is] so remote, 
fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded.”48 In its 
subsequent Flast v. Cohen49 decision, the Court acknowledged that 
Frothingham could be read to rely on either constitutional Article III 
or prudential standing doctrine to deny standing, but the Flast Court 
preferred to read Frothingham as using prudential or policy reasons to 
deny taxpayer standing.50 After many years of uncertainty,51 the 
 
Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized 
Grievance Fail a Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Federal 
Standing to Sue?, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1169, 1173 (2008) 
(arguing that the Court sometimes shifts the line between prudential 
and constitutional standing, especially in generalized grievances cases). 
46. As Professor Chemerinsky laments:  
But what makes some requirements constitutional and others 
prudential? For example, why are injury, causation, and 
redressability deemed constitutionally mandated, but the rules 
against third party standing and generalized grievance merely 
prudential? None are mentioned in the Constitution. All are 
created by the Court because they are viewed as prudent limits 
on federal judicial power. Each is of quite recent origin. So what 
makes some constitutional and the others prudential? The only 
apparent answer sounds terribly cynical: a requirement is 
constitutional if the Court says it is, and it is prudential if the 
Court says it is that. Nothing in the content of the doctrines 
explains their constitutional or prudential status.  
 Chemerinsky, supra note 45, at 692. But see Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975) (explaining the reasoning for prudential 
rules against third-party standing and generalized grievances). 
47.  262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
48. Id. at 487. 
49.  392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
50. Id. at 92–94; see also Solimine, supra note 14, at 1042 (suggesting that 
Flast interpreted Frothingham as a prudential rather than a 
constitutional standing case).  
51. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442–49 
(2011) (discussing Article III barriers to taxpayer standing); Anne 
Abramowitz, Comment, A Remedy for Every Right: What Federal Courts 
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Court only recently ruled explicitly that generalized grievances are 
constitutional rather than prudential.52 
In a law review article written when he was a judge on the D.C. 
Circuit, now-Justice Scalia questioned the very existence of “the so-
called ‘prudential limitations of standing’ allegedly imposed by the 
Court itself, subject to elimination by the Court or by Congress.”53 He 
commented, “Personally, I find this bifurcation [between prudential 
and constitutional standing] unsatisfying—not least because it leaves 
unexplained the Court’s source of authority for simply granting or 
denying standing as its prudence might dictate.”54 Instead, then-Judge 
Scalia suggested that federal courts should eliminate prudential 
standing doctrine and hear all cases for which there is constitutional 
standing: “As I would prefer to view the matter, the Court must 
always hear the case of a litigant who asserts the violation of a legal 
right.”55  
As a member of the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia has not 
directly called for the abolition of prudential standing. But in cases 
where the line between constitutional and prudential standing is 
debatable, he appears to prefer to classify issues as constitutional 
standing rather than prudential.56 In Hein v. Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, Inc.,57 Justice Scalia argued in his concurring opinion, 
which was joined by Justice Thomas, that the Court should overrule 
Flast and squarely hold that the bar against taxpayer standing is 
constitutional and not just prudential.58 Thus, Justice Scalia 
 
Can Learn From California’s Taxpayer Standing, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 
1595, 1605–07 (2010) (providing various scholars’ views on the issue). 
52. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., No. 12-873, slip 
op. at 8 n.3 (2014). 
53. Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element 
of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 885 (1983). See 
generally Bradford C. Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of 
Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer’s Approach to Standing Than to 
Justice Scalia’s, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 71, 106–07 (2012) (discussing Justice 
Scalia’s 1983 criticism of prudential standing and comparing it to Judge 
Posner’s more discretionary approach). 
54. Scalia, supra note 53, at 885. 
55. Id. 
56. See Mank, supra note 53, at 107–08 (analyzing Justice Scalia’s view of 
standing in Lujan). 
57.  551 U.S. 587 (2007). 
58. See id. at 633–37, (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Flast was explicitly and 
erroneously premised on the idea that Article III standing does not 
perform a crucial separation-of-powers function.”); see also Ariz. 
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449–50 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (reiterating his view from Hein that the Court 
should overrule Flast and reject taxpayer standing on constitutional 
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effectively suggested that the Supreme Court can clarify or reclassify 
an issue as a constitutional standing issue, and not a prudential 
standing question, if the Court believes the issue goes to fundamental 
federal jurisdiction. This, interestingly enough, is exactly what Justice 
Scalia did in Lexmark. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Scalia 
stated clearly that generalized grievances, although once considered 
under prudential concerns, are “barred for constitutional reasons, not 
‘prudential’ ones.”59 
As discussed further in Parts I.C and V.D, the uncertainties of 
prudential standing doctrine counsel against treating it as 
jurisdictional. If it addresses the split in the lower courts about the 
jurisdictionality of prudential standing, the Court should also 
reexamine the broader question of how it defines and applies 
prudential standing requirements.  
C. Conflicting Supreme Court Dicta on Whether Prudential Standing  
Is as Important as Article III Standing 
The Supreme Court has never directly decided whether prudential 
standing is jurisdictional. The Court has, however, compared, at least 
in dicta, the importance of prudential standing to that of Article III 
standing. This Part discusses the relative importance of prudential 
standing because it can inform whether prudential standing should be 
treated the same as Article III standing, that is, jurisdictional. If the 
two doctrines are of the same importance, the argument to treat 
prudential standing differently weakens. But, as this Part concludes, 
the Court seems to imply that prudential standing is not of equal 
importance relative to Article III standing requirements, thus 
supporting the argument to treat prudential standing as 
nonjurisdictional in most cases. 
In its 1975 decision Warth v. Seldin,60 the Court suggested that 
prudential standing doctrine is very important to constraining federal 
courts from addressing political questions better left to the political 
branches, but it did not directly decide the jurisdictionality of 
prudential standing. Specifically, the court labeled prudential 
limitations as “closely related to Art. III concerns” and noted that 
“without such limitations . . . the courts would be called upon to decide 
abstract questions of wide public significance even though other 
governmental institutions may be more competent to address the 
questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to 
 
grounds); Solimine, supra note 14, at 1045 (summarizing Justice Scalia’s 
position in his Flast concurrence). 
59. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v Static Control Components, Inc., No. 12-873, slip 
op. at 8 n.3 (2014).  
60.  422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
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protect individual rights.”61 In Thompson v. County of Franklin,62 the 
Second Circuit interpreted the language in Warth as concluding that 
prudential standing concerned the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, 
thus meaning that the court had a duty to sua sponte examine the 
issue despite the failure of the parties to raise the question.63 
On the other hand, in its 1984 decision Allen v. Wright,64 the 
Supreme Court declared that Article III standing, but not prudential 
standing, is “perhaps the most important” of the case or controversy 
doctrines, including “mootness, ripeness, political question, and the 
like.”65 The Allen Court suggested that Article III standing—as a 
“core component” of standing “derived directly from the 
Constitution”—is more important than prudential standing 
doctrines.66 In Alliance for Environmental Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid 
Crossgates Co.,67 the Second Circuit interpreted Allen as treating 
Article III standing as “[m]ore fundamental than judicially imposed, 
prudential limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”68 While not 
 
61. Id. at 500. 
62  15 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 1994). 
63. Id. at 248–49 (noting the “jurisdictional nature of the standing inquiry” 
and indicating that a court’s “obligation to examine subject matter 
jurisdiction” includes “‘the prudential rules of standing that, apart from 
Art. III’s minimum requirements, serve to limit the role of the courts in 
resolving public disputes’” (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 500)). 
64  468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
65. Id. at 750; see also Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid 
Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s emphasis in Allen that Article III standing is the most 
important of the case or controversy doctrines). 
66. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (“Standing doctrine embraces several judicially 
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the 
general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, 
the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more 
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the 
requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests 
protected by the law invoked. The requirement of standing, however, 
has a core component derived directly from the Constitution. A plaintiff 
must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly 
unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”) 
(citations omitted); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United 
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“[The 
Article III requirement] states a limitation on judicial power, not merely 
a factor to be balanced in the weighing of so-called ‘prudential’ 
considerations.”); Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, 436 F.3d at 85 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Allen that Article III 
standing is more important than prudential standing). 
67.  436 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2006). 
68. Id. at 85. 
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directly addressing the jurisdictionality of prudential standing, the 
Allen Court’s suggestion that prudential standing is less important 
than Article III standing supports the idea that prudential standing 
could be treated as nonjurisdictional since it is less important than 
the core jurisdictional questions of Article III standing. 
In light of the Court’s conflicting dicta in Warth and Allen about 
whether prudential standing doctrine is as crucial to federal courts as 
Article III standing principles, it is understandable that lower federal 
courts are split regarding the jurisdictionality of prudential standing.69 
A recent Supreme Court case that involved prudential standing, 
United States v. Windsor,70 however, did not provide any guidance to 
lower federal courts on the issue. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
drew sharp distinctions between prudential standing and Article III 
standing, stating that prudential standing rules are “more flexible” 
than the jurisdictional requirements of Article III standing.71 Further 
distinguishing the two standing doctrines, Justice Kennedy reasoned 
that the general principle that prevailing parties cannot appeal a 
decision—which would normally prevent the Supreme Court from 
hearing the case because the executive branch agreed with lower court 
decisions favoring Ms. Windsor and invalidating DOMA—was a mere 
prudential rule to which the Court could apply an established 
exception because the principle “does not have its source in the 
jurisdictional limitations of Art[icle] III.”72  
In his dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia justifiably complained 
that the majority’s act of “[r]elegating a jurisdictional requirement to 
“prudential” status is a wondrous device, enabling courts to ignore 
the requirement whenever they believe it “prudent”—which is to say, 
a good idea.”73 The Windsor Court did not specifically address the 
jurisdictionality of prudential standing, but it implied that the Court 
could treat its rules as nonjurisdictional at its convenience. It remains 
to be seen whether the Court will apply Windsor’s lax approach to 
prudential standing in cases where the Court is less eager to ignore or 
elide standing difficulties in a quest to address the merits of a case.  
Thus, even after Windsor, the questions and ambiguity stemming 
from the Warth and Allen dicta remain. Judge Posner and a number 
of scholars have argued that the Court’s standing doctrine is so 
confused that the whole doctrine should be either abolished or 
radically reformed, but it is more likely that the Court will modify the 
 
69. See supra Part III.B.  
70  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
71. Id. at 2686.  
72. Id. at 2687.  
73. Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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doctrine around the edges.74 If it eventually addresses the 
jurisdictionality of prudential standing, the Court should take at least 
a modest step toward clarifying its complex and confusing standing 
doctrine. For the purposes of this Article, however, it is noteworthy 
that Warth preceded Allen and, as discussed in Parts III.C and V.D, 
more recent Court decisions, while not explicitly overruling Warth, 
have clearly sought to narrow the scope of which issues are 
jurisdictional. Thus, the Allen Court’s suggestion that Article III 
standing requirements outweigh prudential standing requirements in 
terms of importance supports this Article’s argument that prudential 
standing should be treated differently, that is, as nonjurisdictional. 
II. Why Are Some Legal Issues Jurisdictional? 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the “Cases” and 
“Controversies” language in Article III of the Constitution to mean 
 
74. While many scholars and Judge Posner have agreed that the Supreme 
Court’s current Article III standing doctrine is hopelessly flawed and 
should be drastically changed or abandoned, they differ on how to change 
that doctrine. See, e.g., Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (questioning the 
Supreme Court’s Article III doctrine of standing in light of the many 
scholarly criticisms of the doctrine and instead arguing that the “solidest 
grounds” for the doctrine of standing are “practical”); 13A Charles 
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 3531.1 (3d ed. 2008) (“All of these 
[standing] concepts, both constitutional and prudential, are slippery. 
Difficult tasks of judgment are required, invoking an elaboration of 
competing judicial philosophies that leads often to hot dispute and 
sometimes to disingenuous manipulation.”); Daniel A. Farber, A Place-
Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1505, 1543–46 (2008) 
(questioning the historical evidence and constitutional basis for modern 
standing requirements); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s 
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 
69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 512–17 (1994) (finding a lack of historical 
support for contemporary standing requirements); Steven L. Winter, The 
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1371, 1376 n.26, 1418–25 (1988) (pointing to the lack of discussion 
about standing in Felix Frankfurter’s casebook, Cases and Other 
Materials on Administrative Law 194–363 (Felix Frankfurter & 
J. Forrester Davison eds., 1932) and tracing the early development of the 
concept in the Court).  
 Nevertheless, like Justice Breyer, this author believes it would be more 
fruitful to adapt and liberalize current standing precedent and doctrine 
through a “realistic threat” test than to completely scrap existing doctrine 
and establish a new system. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 
488, 503–10 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Supreme Court 
precedent establishes the realistic-threat standing test, which should not 
be more stringent than the word realistic implies); Mank, supra note 53, 
at 115–19 (discussing favorably Justice Breyer’s realistic approach to 
liberalizing current standing precedent and doctrine). 
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that Article III courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, empowered 
only to hear certain kinds of cases for which they have jurisdiction 
and required to dismiss all cases in which there is not federal 
jurisdiction.75 The Supreme Court has defined jurisdiction as going to 
the essential “authority” of federal courts to decide a case in light of 
the separation of powers principles in the Constitution.76 Because 
defining federal jurisdiction is crucial to deciding which cases a federal 
court can consider, federal courts have established rigid distinctions 
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional issues.77 Because 
jurisdiction is considered absolutely mandatory for the authority of 
federal courts, a federal court must raise the issue sua sponte on 
appeal to dismiss a case even if the parties have not raised the issue.78  
On the other hand, nonjurisdictional issues are generally left in 
the control of the parties and may even be ignored.79 As Professor 
Dodson has observed, “[N]onjurisdictional rules usually are defined as 
having all the inverse effects of jurisdictionality—they can be waived, 
forfeited, or consented to, and they are subject to equitable 
exceptions, estoppel, and judicial discretion.”80 A federal court must 
sua sponte dismiss a case for jurisdictional reasons, but it may freely 
ignore a nonjurisdictional issue if a party does not challenge the issue 
within defined time limits.81 
But labeling a question as jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional does 
not mean that federal courts will automatically hear a case if the 
 
75. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 339–54 (2006) 
(explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III’s case and 
controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations and demands a 
plaintiff prove jurisdiction for each form of relief sought); supra Part I.A. 
76. See Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 1439, 
1445 (2011). 
77. See Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 
23 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 4 (1994) (“In modern Anglo-American legal 
doctrine, legal issues are either ‘jurisdictional’ or ‘non-jurisdictional.’”); 
Dodson, supra note 76, at 1444 (“The usual conceptualization of 
jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality is that of separate spheres and 
mutually opposing characteristics—they are antitheses of each other.”). 
78. Dodson, supra note 76, at 1445. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006) (“A statute of 
limitations defense . . . is not ‘jurisdictional,’ hence courts are under no 
obligation to raise the time bar sua sponte.” (emphasis omitted)); see also 
id. at 213 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have repeatedly stated that the 
enactment of time-limitation periods such as that in §2244(d), without 
further elaboration, produces defenses that are nonjurisdictional and thus 
subject to waiver and forfeiture.”); Dodson, supra note 76, at 1446–47 
(noting the use of a jurisdictional appeal time limit in a murder case). 
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parties satisfy jurisdictional requirements; that federal courts lack the 
power to raise nonjurisdictional issues sua sponte; or that federal 
courts lack discretion in determining whether the facts of the case 
satisfy the particular requirement. First, even though the Supreme 
Court has declared that jurisdiction is a “virtually unflagging 
obligation,”82 federal courts have developed several doctrines, most 
notably abstention doctrines, that allow a federal court to decline 
jurisdiction, especially if a case may proceed instead in a state court 
or administrative hearing.83 Notably, for the purposes of this Article, 
some have argued that prudential standing doctrine is a discretionary 
principle that federal courts can invoke to avoid federal jurisdiction, 
even if they have the constitutional authority to hear the case 
pursuant to Article III.84 Yet despite scholarly criticisms of judicially 
created discretionary exceptions to federal jurisdiction,85 doctrines 
 
82. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 
817 (1976); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 
(1821) (“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction 
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the 
other would be treason to the constitution.”). 
83. See Dodson, supra note 76, at 1456–57 (“[Courts exercise] judicially 
created discretion [in order] to repeatedly decline jurisdiction. . . . [E]ven 
if the jurisdiction is proper, and despite the common rhetoric that 
jurisdiction is not subject to court control.”). 
84. See id. (observing that prudential standing is an example of a 
discretionary exception to the rule that federal courts have a duty to 
exercise federal jurisdiction). But see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501–
02 (1975) (discussing prudential standing as being on par with mandatory, 
jurisdictional Article III standing in “serv[ing] to limit the role of the 
courts in resolving public disputes”). 
85. A number of scholars have criticized or questioned federal courts for 
using abstention and other doctrines to avoid asserting federal 
jurisdiction. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 Stan. L. 
Rev. 971, 990 (2009) (discussing abstention in the context of 
jurisdictional obligation); Dodson, supra note 76, at 1456–57 (observing 
that the exercise of federal jurisdiction is subject to discretionary 
doctrines such as abstention); Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: 
Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 Geo. L.J. 99, 103–04 (1986) 
(criticizing the abstention doctrine as inconsistent with the duty of 
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction and for being “an unprincipled 
means of serving the convenience of the federal courts”); Martin H. 
Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71, 71–75 (1984) (citing separation of powers 
principles and questioning the authority of federal courts to decline 
jurisdiction under the abstention doctrine). But see David L. Shapiro, 
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1985) 
(“[S]uggestions of an overriding obligation, subject only and at most to a 
few narrowly drawn exceptions, are far too grudging in their recognition of 
judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction.”). See generally Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and 
the Federal System 1061–62 & n.4 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation 
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such as prudential standing and abstention remain valid.86 
Second, even though an issue may be deemed nonjurisdictional 
and apparently left to the parties—without a duty on the court’s part 
to consider the issue before the merits—federal courts may exercise 
discretion and raise the issue sua sponte where appropriate. Whether 
this discretionary authority already exists for prudential standing, as 
Judge Silberman has argued,87 or should exist, as others have argued,88 
is an issue that remains to be addressed by the Court. Both 
arguments, however, point to the fact that the Court permits other 
seemingly nonjurisdictional issues, including prudential ripeness, to be 
raised sua sponte by courts.89 
Finally, while jurisdiction may be fundamental for the proper 
exercise of federal-court authority over a case, federal courts have 
some discretion regarding “the manner in which jurisdictional issues 
are . . . resolved [and] the degree to which a court must be persuaded 
that jurisdiction exists.”90 This discretion stems from the fact that 
“[m]any questions of jurisdiction turn on issues of fact, which, in turn, 
present evidentiary questions that can admit of a variety of rational 
solutions.”91 
Thus, while the distinctions between jurisdictional and 
nonjurisdictional questions—including the different ramifications that 
flow from each categorization—remain highly relevant to this Article’s 
argument about the jurisdictionality of prudential standing, the story 
does not end there. This Article argues that prudential standing 
should be considered nonjurisdictional. But, even treating prudential 
 
Press 6th ed. 2009) (contrasting various scholars’ views on whether federal 
courts should exercise discretionary jurisdiction). 
86. See Dodson, supra note 76, at 1456–57.  
87. Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 678 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (Silberman, J., concurring) (citing two Supreme Court cases and 
the 1994 D.C. Circuit case that established prudential standing as 
jurisdictional in that circuit).  
88. William James Goodling, Comment, Distinct Sources of Law and 
Distinct Doctrines: Federal Jurisdiction and Prudential Standing, 
88 Wash. L. Rev. 1153, 1179–86 (2013). 
89. Id. at 1183 (discussing prudential ripeness, Pullman abstention, and 
state-remedy exhaustion for habeas corpus petitioners); Ass’n of Battery 
Recyclers, 716 F.3d at 678 n.6 (“Prudential standing might therefore 
stand on the same footing as prudential ripeness.”); see also supra 
note 7 and accompanying text (discussing prudential ripeness). 
90. Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 Va. L. Rev. 
1829, 1896–97 (2007). 
91. Id. 
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standing as nonjurisdictional, courts could still exercise discretion and 
invoke the doctrine’s requirements sua sponte to decline jurisdiction.92 
III. Precedential Support Invoked by Recent Judicial 
Opinions Addressing the Jurisdictionality of 
Prudential Standing 
As Parts I.B and I.C explained, the Supreme Court has never 
precisely defined the scope and nature of the prudential standing 
doctrine. Accordingly, it is not surprising that federal courts are 
divided regarding whether prudential standing is jurisdictional.93 Two 
judges in particular have addressed in detail whether prudential 
standing is or may be jurisdictional—Judges Kavanaugh94 and 
Silberman95 of the D.C. Circuit—although both of the underlying 
cases involved statutory zone of interests questions,96 which are no 
longer considered prudential standing.97 Despite this limitation, both 
judges’ arguments invoked precedents that still apply to prudential 
standing generally. This Part discusses the support relied on by 
Judges Kavanaugh and Silberman, including the recent Supreme 
Court trend to narrow which issues are jurisdictional. Ultimately, 
however, this Article proposes that the argument for treating 
prudential standing as nonjurisdictional can be strengthened by 
considering why the Court has recently engaged in such narrowing.98 
A. Supreme Court Precedent and the Recent Trend to Narrow 
Jurisdictional Issues 
Judges Kavanaugh and Silberman both pointed to recent Supreme 
Court cases indicating that the issues considered jurisdictional should 
be limited. Additionally, Judge Kavanaugh argued that a Court 
 
92. Although not central to this Article’s argument, the same principle of 
adversarial-party-controlled litigation that supports considering 
prudential standing nonjurisdictional also supports the notion that 
courts should use their discretion judiciously, raising prudential standing 
issues sua sponte only after considering the impact of such a move as an 
exception to the adversarial system. See infra Part V. 
93. See infra Part III.B (discussing conflicting court of appeals decisions on 
the jurisdictionality of prudential standing). 
94. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 180 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013). 
95. Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 674 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (Silberman, J., concurring).   
96. Id. (per curium); Grocery Mfrs, 693 F.3d at 179 (majority opinion). 
97. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v Static Control Components, Inc., No. 12-873, slip 
op. at 8 (2014). 
98. See infra Part V.  
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statement specific to prudential standing suggests that the issue 
should not be considered jurisdictional. 
Regarding the Court’s recent trend to narrow issues that are 
jurisdictional, Judge Kavanaugh provided a more in-depth analysis 
than Judge Silberman. But both of these arguments are limited 
because the cases cited as constituting the Supreme Court’s recent 
trend all involve statutory zone of interests questions,99 which are no 
longer considered prudential standing.100 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile 
to explore the arguments to the extent that Judges Kavanaugh and 
Silberman interpreted the Supreme Court cases as applicable to 
prudential standing generally. Moreover, lending support to the 
generalizability of the trend beyond statutory zone of interests 
questions, at least one court has found the trend persuasive in finding 
a comity issue nonjurisdictional.101 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kavanaugh first argued more 
generally that in the last several years, the Supreme Court has been 
“tighten[ing]” the definition of what constitutes a genuine 
jurisdictional issue.102 In his view, the Court has, in recent years, 
placed “the terminology of jurisdiction . . . under a microscope.”103 
More importantly, Judge Kavanaugh opined that “the Court has not 
liked what it has observed—namely, sloppy and profligate use of the 
term ‘jurisdiction’ by lower courts and, at times in the past, the 
Supreme Court itself.”104 Finally, Judge Kavanaugh cited several cases 
to support his argument that “recent Supreme Court cases have 
significantly tightened and focused the analysis governing when a 
statutory requirement is jurisdictional.”105 Although Judge Kavanaugh 
 
99. See infra notes 105, 111 (listing the Supreme Court cases cited by 
Judges Kavanaugh and Silberman).  
100. Lexmark, slip op. at 8.   
101. Capra v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, 733 F.3d 705, 713 n.6 (7th Cir. 
2013) cert. denied. 134 S.Ct. 1027 (2014). 
102. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013). 
103. Id. at 183.  
104. Id.  
105. Id. at 184. The cited cases include Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 
(2012); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202–02 
(2011); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010); Bowles v. 
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007); Arbaugh v Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 
510 (2006); and Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004).  Grocery 
Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 184. But see generally Erin Morrow Hawley, 
Jurisdictional Quandaries: A Way Forward 1–4 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2012-37, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188101 
(noting the recent “sea-change” in the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
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concluded that construing prudential standing as nonjurisdictional 
would be consistent with the Court’s recent trend, his conclusion’s 
generalizability is limited because he equated prudential standing and 
the aggrieved party provision of the Administrative Procedure Act106 
(APA) and thus analyzed a zone of interests question rather than 
prudential standing generally.107  
Judge Silbmerman, on the other hand, made clear in his 
concurring opinion that statutory zone of interests questions were 
distinct from other prudential standing issues.108 He did, however, also 
make a more general statement pertaining to the Supreme Court’s 
recent trend to narrow the issues considered jurisdictional.109 
Specifically, Judge Silberman noted that the Supreme Court has 
recently “appear[ed] to limit jurisdictional issues (besides Article III) 
to subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.”110 To support his 
statement, Judge Silberman cited two cases that were also cited by 
Judge Kavanaugh.111 Notably, however, Judge Silberman stressed that 
the Court’s statements were made in dicta, and that the Court has 
 
“preconditions to suit” as nonjurisdictional and arguing that such 
treatment is problematic).  
106. Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).  
107.  Grocery Mfrs, 693 F.3d at 182. Judge Kavanaugh explained that under 
the APA, parties must be “‘aggrieved’ by the [complained of] agency 
action” and that this requirement “is referred to (somewhat loosely and 
imprecisely) as prudential standing.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012)). 
Stated another way, Judge Kavanaugh attributed the APA provision as 
the source from which prudential standing, “an aspect of the cause of 
action[,] . . . stems.” Id. at 183 (“Prudential standing concerns who may 
sue; it is an aspect of the cause of action that stems from the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s limiting its cause of action to 
‘aggrieved’ parties.” (citing Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 
2362–63 (2011); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 
& n.2 (1998))). Thus, to assess the jurisdictionality of prudential 
standing, Judge Kavanaugh analyzed the jurisdictionality of the APA’s 
aggrieved party requirement. 
108. Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 675–76 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring) (“[T]he term ‘prudential standing’ 
is a misnomer—at least in the context of whether a plaintiff . . . is 
within the ‘zone of interests’ . . . .”). A unanimous Supreme Court 
recently endorsed Judge Silberman’s view when it excluded the zone of 
interests test from prudential standing. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v Static 
Control Components, Inc., No. 12-873, slip op. at 8 (2014). 
109. Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, 716 F.3d at 677.  
110. Id.   
111. Compare id. (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160–
61 (2010); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)), with supra 
note 105 (listing the Supreme Court cases cited by Judge Kavanaugh). 
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not ruled specifically as to the jurisdictionality of prudential 
standing.112 
Looking to specific language rather than the Supreme Court’s 
recent trend to narrow the issues considered jurisdictional, Judge 
Kavanaugh argued that the Supreme Court, although not directly 
addressing the issue, had suggested that prudential standing is not 
jurisdictional.113 For this proposition, Judge Kavanaugh cited a 
passage from Tenet v. Doe,114 where the Court “noted that prudential 
standing is a ‘threshold question’ that ‘may be resolved before 
addressing jurisdiction.’”115 Furthermore, while Judge Kavanaugh 
acknowledged that the “snippet alone may be too thin a reed on 
which to base a definitive conclusion,” he contended “it  certainly is 
consistent with the thrust of the recent Supreme Court precedents on 
jurisdiction and points us further in the direction of saying that 
prudential standing is not jurisdictional.”116 Thus, Judge Kavanaugh 
proposed that the Court’s suggestion in Tenet, while not binding, 
should be adopted as a new rule in light of the Court’s recent trend of 
narrowing the definition of jurisdictional issues. 
B. Circuit Courts Split but Trend Points Toward Prudential Standing 
Being Nonjurisdictional 
Judges Kavanaugh and Silberman also looked to circuit court 
precedents, including some from the D.C. Circuit, to support their 
arguments. Unlike the cases cited as part of the Supreme Court’s 
recent trend—all of which addressed statutory zone of interests 
questions117—many of the cited circuit court cases dealt with issues 
other than the zone of interests test, such as the prudential ban on 
third-party standing.118 Thus, these cases may provide more direct 
support for the argument that prudential standing is not 
jurisdictional. Finally, because Judges Kavanaugh’s and Silberman’s 
 
112. Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, 716 F.3d at 677. The Court has, however, 
recently noted the jurisdictionality of the zone of interests test and the 
ban against generalized grievances, both of which were previously 
considered prudential standing. Lexmark, slip op. at 8 n.3, 9 n.4 
(holding that generalized grievances is a constitutional barrier, and thus 
jurisdictional, and that statutory standing is not jurisdictional, despite 
past indications and treatment by the Court). 
113. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013). 
114. 544 U.S. 1 (2005).  
115. Grocery Mfrs, 693 F.3d at 184 (quoting Tenet, 544 U.S. at 6 n.4). 
116. Id.   
117. See supra text accompanying notes 96–97 and notes 105, 111 (listing the 
Supreme Court cases cited by Judges Kavanaugh and Silberman).  
118. See infra note 121 for a list of cases cited by Judge Kavanaugh. 
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arguments differ slightly, their reliance on the circuit precedents also 
varies. 
Judge Kavanaugh sought to persuade the three-judge panel to 
part from previous D.C. Circuit precedent holding prudential standing 
is jurisdictional.119 To support this proposition, Judge Kavanaugh 
argued more broadly that since 1999, six federal circuits had 
concluded that prudential standing is not jurisdictional and that these 
decisions coincided with and reflected the Supreme Court’s intensified 
focus on the proper use of the term jurisdiction.120 Notably, although 
these six circuit decisions state that prudential standing is not 
jurisdictional, they do not provide the full substantive analysis found 
in Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent.121  
Specific to the D.C. Circuit, Judge Kavanaugh claimed that “our 
more recent cases have indicated that prudential standing is not 
jurisdictional,”122 but he acknowledged that some older cases had 
 
119. Judge Tatel—who wrote a separate concurrence and agreed with Judge 
Kavanaugh that prudential standing is nonjurisdictional—found that the 
court, absent clear conflict with Supreme Court precedent, was bound to 
follow D.C. Circuit precedent that prudential standing is jurisdictional. 
Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 180 (Tatel, J., concurring). Judge Kavanaugh 
disagreed, stating the court’s “duty” was “to obey the clear charge given 
by the Supreme Court rather than to cling to a stale slice of our 
precedent—precedent which not only has been undermined by subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions but also has not been followed by our Court in 
several recent cases.” Id. at 185 n.4 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. at 184–85; Recent Case, supra note 9, at 1449.  
121. Judge Kavanaugh’s list of six circuit decisions is as follows: Board of 
Mississippi Levee Commissioners v. EPA, 674 F.3d 409, 417 (5th Cir. 
2012); Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. 
Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065 n.17 (9th Cir. 2008); Rawoof v. Texor 
Petroleum Co., 521 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2008); Finstuen v. Crutcher, 
496 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007); Gilda Industries, Inc. v. United 
States, 446 F.3d 1271, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2006); and American Iron & Steel 
Institute v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1274 n.10 (11th Cir. 1999). Grocery 
Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 184–86.  
122. Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 185 n.4 (emphasis added); see also Oryszak 
v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (“That the court may in its discretion address a threshold 
question before establishing that it has jurisdiction does not render the 
question jurisdictional nor, significantly, does it mean the court must 
address that question at the outset of the case.”); Am. Chiropractic 
Ass’n v. Leavitt, 431 F.3d 812, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (contrasting “the 
less-than-demanding zone-of-interest test” with “[t]he jurisdictional 
question”); Toca Producers v. FERC, 411 F.3d 262, 265 n.* (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he prudential standing doctrine, like the abstention doctrine, 
‘represents the sort of “threshold question” [that] may be resolved before 
addressing jurisdiction’” (quoting Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 
(2005))); Amgen Inc. v. Smith, 357 F.3d 103, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(“That Amgen has prudential standing does not resolve this appeal, 
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“said that prudential standing was jurisdictional.”123 Judge 
Kavanaugh’s word choice, however, is revealing: by using the weak 
word “indicated,” Judge Kavanaugh impliedly conceded fellow panel 
member Judge Tatel’s point that the statements in the more recent 
cases constituted dicta that were in “tension” with, but never actually 
overruled, the earlier cases.124 Nevertheless, Judge Kavanaugh argued 
that the older cases should be read not in isolation but in the context 
of recent Supreme Court precedent. And such a reading suggested 
that “[t]o the extent older cases assumed prudential standing to be 
jurisdictional, that assumption is no longer correct after [recent] 
Supreme Court cases.”125  
Judge Silberman, on the other hand, argued that circuit courts’ 
differing treatment of statutory zone of interests questions and other 
prudential issues, such as the ban against third party standing, and 
the lack of clarity from the Court counsel against parting from the 
D.C. Circuit’s precedent treating prudential standing as jurisdictional 
until the Court provides clear guidance.126 Thus, Judge Silberman 
distinguished most circuit court decisions that had held that 
prudential standing is nonjurisdictional by arguing that they 
“concerned only third-party standing, which really is a judge-made 
concept.”127 He further argued that the two decisions holding that the 
zone of interests test is nonjurisdictional had failed to “recognize or 
discuss any difference between statutory standing and prudential 
standing generally.”128 
 
however. Another threshold issue is whether the court has jurisdiction to 
entertain Amgen’s complaint.”). 
123. Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 185 n.4 (citing Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. 
v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 723 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
124. Compare id. at 180 (Tatel, J., concurring) (“[P]assing statements by 
subsequent panels may be in some tension with these earlier decisions.”), 
with id. at 185 n.4 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur more recent cases 
have indicated that prudential standing is not jurisdictional.”) (emphasis 
added)). 
125. Id. at 185 n.4 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  
126. Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 677–78 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J., concurring). 
127. Id. (citing four cases from the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits). Three of 
the cases cited by Judge Silberman were also cited by Judge Kavanaugh. 
See id.; supra note 121 (listing the circuit court cases cited by Judge 
Kavanaugh). Additionally, Judge Silberman cited Board of Natural 
Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993). Ass’n of Battery 
Recyclers, 716 F.3d at 677. 
128. Id. (citing Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007); 
Gilda Indus., Inc. v. United States, 446 F.3d 1271, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 
2006)). These two cases were also cited by Judge Kavanaugh. See supra 
note 121 (listing the circuit court cases cited by Judge Kavanaugh). 
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In conclusion, although both Judges Kavanaugh’s and Silberman’s 
arguments arise from cases involving the statutory zone of interests 
test, which is no longer considered prudential standing, their analyses 
remain relevant to the extent that they consider the impact of 
Supreme Court and circuit court precedents on the jurisdictionality of 
prudential standing generally. But, as discussed in Part V, their 
arguments can be further strengthened by considering why the 
Supreme Court has sought to narrow issues that are jurisdictional. 
IV. Separation of Powers Argument for Treating 
Prudential Standing as Nonjurisdictional by Allowing 
the Executive Branch to Waive the Issue 
Part I.A demonstrated that separation of powers principles are 
central to standing doctrine.129 Accordingly, separation of powers 
principles should be the key to resolving the jurisdictionality of 
prudential standing. This Part examines a possible separation of 
powers argument for treating prudential standing as 
nonjurisdictional.130 There is a plausible argument that the executive 
branch should be able to waive prudential standing barriers in some 
cases—thus treating prudential standing as a discretionary, 
nonjurisdictional issue because jurisdiction cannot be consented to by 
waiver131—but there are also concerns that executive waivers might in 
some cases be contrary to congressional intent.132 Ultimately, 
separation of powers principles are important in understanding 
whether prudential standing should be considered jurisdictional, but 
there may often be conflicting arguments about the application of 
those principles in a particular case. Given this weakness, this Article 
posits that, consistent with traditional adversarial system principles, 
the parties, rather than the executive, should be able to waive 
prudential standing. 
A Harvard Law Review student commentary addressing Grocery 
Manufacturers Association v. EPA133 argues for executive branch  
129. For additional analysis of the separation of powers principle’s 
relationship to standing, see Recent Case, supra note 9, at 1449–53.  
130. Not addressed in detail in this Article but worthy of mention is a recent 
student comment arguing prudential standing should be 
nonjurisdictional because, among other things, “only the Constitution 
and Congress hold the power to set federal courts’ jurisdiction.” 
Goodling, supra note 88, at 1156.  
131. People’s Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1880) (“It needs no 
citation of authorities to show that the mere consent of parties cannot 
confer upon a court of the United States the jurisdiction to hear and 
decide a case.”).  
132. Recent Case, supra note 9, at 1448–53. 
133. 693 F.3d 169, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013).  
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waiver of prudential standing in certain circumstances.134 The 
commentary notes that “the courts should not simply defer to the 
executive;” rather courts should—“consistent with the separation of 
powers principles underlying prudential standing”—“consider whether 
an executive branch decision to concede prudential standing respects 
the proper roles of the three branches, or instead is an attempt to 
advance the executive’s own priorities at the expense of the other 
branches.”135 After observing that Grocery Manufacturers leaves the 
federal circuits divided on an important question that should be 
resolved more thoroughly by the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court, 
the commentary criticizes the majority for imposing a “mandatory” 
jurisdictional rule for prudential standing that precludes the executive 
branch from waiving prudential standing barriers, even when such a 
waiver would advance separation of powers principles.136  
The commentary presents two strong separation of powers reasons 
for allowing the executive branch to waive prudential standing 
barriers, but it acknowledges a third situation where such a waiver 
might undermine those principles if the executive is taking the action 
to contravene congressional intent.137 First, under separation of powers 
principles, courts should not interfere with the executive branch’s 
decision to waive prudential standing if the executive is simply 
seeking to resolve a disputed regulatory issue as quickly as possible by 
allowing a case to be resolved on the merits rather than be dismissed 
for prudential standing concerns.138 The executive branch may 
legitimately believe that both the government and regulatory parties 
are better served by a clear decision on the merits than a procedural 
victory on prudential standing that delays the resolution of an 
important merits question.139 Moreover, a swift resolution of a merits 
question is generally consistent with Congress’s legislative purposes 
because it promotes legal certainty.140 In Grocery Manufacturers, it 
would have been reasonable for the government to seek a merits 
determination on the partial waiver by declining to raise prudential 
standing barriers rather than simply delay the resolution of that 
important question through a dismissal based on procedural 
prudential standing issues.141 Second, and relatedly, because of the 
 
134. Recent Case, supra note 9, at 1449. 
135. Id.  
136. Id. (emphasis added). 
137. Id. at 1450–53. 
138. Id. at 1451–52. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 1452. 
141. Id. at 1452–53. 
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value of resolving merit questions, a presidential administration could 
adopt a policy of never invoking prudential standing where the 
doctrine would either delay a decision or insulate it from judicial 
review.142 
On the other hand, the commentary acknowledges that executive 
waivers of prudential standing doctrine might be used in ways that 
contravene congressional intent and, therefore, separation of powers 
principles. For example, although the Carter Administration failed to 
convince Congress to adopt legislation that would ease standing 
requirements for citizen suits challenging government actions, the 
administration then refused to challenge plaintiff standing in 
environmental litigation, despite Congress’s lack of endorsement for 
that approach.143 Similarly, the Obama Administration—which has 
often failed to win congressional approval for its agenda of reducing 
greenhouse gases—might choose to waive standing barriers so it can 
obtain court decisions on the merits that support those unendorsed 
policy goals.144 Thus, as the commentary concedes, some executive 
waivers of prudential standing doctrine might be contrary to 
congressional policy goals. 
In its conclusion, the commentary argues for a separation of 
powers approach to prudential standing. Specifically, the commentary 
would give judges the discretion to allow the executive branch to 
waive prudential standing as long as such actions were not contrary 
to congressional intent.145 A problem with this approach is that 
determining when an executive waiver of prudential standing is 
contrary to congressional intent is more difficult than suggested. Is 
legislative inaction or opposition by one house of Congress enough to 
constitute a contrary congressional intent, or must there be an express 
congressional enactment at odds with the executive waiver for a court 
to override the waiver by invoking prudential standing doctrine 
despite executive acquiescence? Because of the difficulties in 
determining when executive waivers and congressional intent either 
coincide or disagree, this Article proposes, in accordance with the 
adversarial system’s principle of party control, to give the parties sole 
control of when to waive prudential standing. 
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V. The Anglo-American Legal System’s Adversarial 
Approach Favors Treating Prudential Standing as 
Nonjurisdictional and Allowing Parties to Control 
the Issue 
The Supreme Court has in recent years sought to limit the scope 
of which issues are considered jurisdictional.146 As I argued in the 
Introduction, however, the greatest weakness of Judges Kavanaugh’s 
and Silberman’s opinions is that they did not fully explain why the 
Court has sought to narrow the range of jurisdictional issues. This 
Part examines the historical development of the Anglo-American 
adversarial system and discusses how jurisdictional issues are an 
inquisitorial exception to the usual operation of that system. 
Part V.D argues that our adversarial legal system is based on the 
premise that the parties should control the proceedings, except in rare 
cases where a federal judge may intervene sua sponte to ensure that 
the court has Article III jurisdiction. As this Part concludes, 
prudential standing is not so closely entwined with Article III 
jurisdiction to require an exception to our adversarial traditions of 
party autonomy in a free society. Finally, the fact that prudential 
standing questions are often entangled with merits questions lends 
further support for treating prudential standing as nonjurisdictional. 
A. The Historical Development of Adversarial and Inquisitorial Court 
Systems 
During the centuries following the collapse of the western Roman 
Empire in the 400s, continental European nations gradually developed 
inquisitorial court systems in which judges, rather than adversarial 
parties, exercised a significant role in controlling civil litigation.147 The 
continental European inquisitorial, or civil law, tradition drew upon 
both Roman law and the Catholic Church’s canon law, which itself 
 
146. See supra Part III.A. 
147. See Thomas Glyn Watkin, An Historical Introduction to 
Modern Civil Law 2, 13 (1999) (referring to the fifth-century collapse of 
the western Roman Empire and the reemergence of Roman civil law in 
Italy and France in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, thus “influenc[ing] 
first the legal culture of the western catholic Church and then the legal 
arrangements of many of the secular societies of western Europe”); Robert 
W. Emerson, The French Huissier as a Model for U.S. Civil Procedure 
Reform, 43 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1043, 1053 (2010) (“[T]he customs, 
traditions, and judicial concepts that form the basis of the Continental 
and French procedural systems emerged out of Rome.”); Amalia D. 
Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and 
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 
1181, 1193, 1198–1201 (2005) (describing the procedure “used in the 
courts of continental Europe” as being “derived from the Roman-canon 
tradition and thus . . . significantly inquisitorial”). 
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was heavily influenced by Roman law.148 Even today, civil litigation in 
France and many other continental European courts is largely 
controlled by an inquisitorial judge who is solely in charge of 
collecting evidence.149 That judge, or a lesser nonjudge court official 
acting on the court’s behalf, plays an active role in conducting 
discovery and interviewing witnesses in civil cases.150 Although parties 
initiate proceedings for their claims, determine the issues, identify 
evidence to support their allegations, and now may be present with 
counsel for testimony, many aspects are controlled by the court, 
which can often pursue evidence and issues sua sponte.151 Moreover, 
parties must obtain permission of the judge before they may engage in 
discovery, question witnesses, or demand evidence from the opposing 
party.152 
From the Middle Ages through the late eighteenth century, the 
English legal system and the American colonial courts that grew from 
that system contained a mixture of inquisitorial and adversarial 
elements, with the inquisitorial aspects concentrated in the courts of 
equity and adversarial lawyering gradually growing as the 
predominant method of proving cases in the courts of common law.153 
 
148. Watkin, supra note 147, at 9–10 (noting that while modern civil law “is 
rooted in the law of ancient Rome,” many elements derive from the 
“canon law of the western Church, . . . [which was] based on decidedly 
Roman legal foundations”); Emerson, supra note 147, at 1053; Kessler, 
supra note 147, at 1193, 1200–03. 
149. Watkin, supra note 147, at 390–91 (noting that many countries 
“follow[ ] the traditional French inquisitorial practice” of appointing one 
of the judges to assemble the evidence in a dossier” and that “[w]here 
the evidence has been collected by an instruction judge, the trial 
amounts very often to no more than the confirmation of that evidence 
as presented in the dossier”); Emerson, supra note 147, at 1046–47, 
1050–53, 1068–86; Kessler, supra note 147, at 1260–73. 
150. Watkin, supra note 147, at 390–91; Emerson, supra note 147, at 1079–
86; Kessler, supra note 147, at 1263–70. 
151. Watkin, supra note 147, at 390–91; Kessler, supra note 147, at 1261–67 
(describing the initial stage of French litigation, known as the mise en 
état, the procedure for collecting witness testimony, known as the 
enquête, and the processes for engaging experts). 
152. Kessler, supra note 147, at 1261–62. 
153. Compare Emerson, supra note 147, at 1054–58 (discussing the 
inquisitorial aspects of American equity courts), and Kessler, supra 
note 147, at 1199–1202 (discussing the history and development of the 
Anglo-American equity tradition through the English Court of 
Chancery), with Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A 
Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 245, 272–86 (2002) (discussing the adversarial nature of Anglo-
American common law courts and how sua sponte decisions are 
inconsistent with this nature). 
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In the centuries leading up to the American Revolution, Anglo-
American common law courts gradually developed an adversarial 
tradition in which the parties played a central role in determining the 
facts and truth in civil litigation.154 Compared to the inquisitorial 
judges in Europe, Anglo-American common law judges play a more 
neutral and passive role in civil litigation, although there are 
occasional exceptions to their passivity when they decide 
jurisdictional issues.155 Some commentators argue that the party-
controlled litigation model in the Anglo-American legal system is 
based on the fundamental premise that free individuals in a 
democratic society ought to have the autonomy and dignity to make 
litigation decisions instead of being directed by a paternalistic 
inquisitorial judge.156 
Before 1800, Anglo-American equity courts were in many respects 
inquisitorial.157 Even into the nineteenth century, Anglo-American 
equitable courts traditionally exercised quasi-inquisitorial functions, 
especially through the use of masters to investigate a case and 
question witnesses.158 During the nineteenth century, however, 
American equity courts gradually granted parties a greater role in 
investigating cases and questioning witnesses so that equitable cases 
increasingly became adversarial rather than inquisitorial.159 
B. The Federal Courts from the Eighteenth Century Until the 1938 
Rules of Civil Procedure: A Mostly Adversarial System with Some Role 
for Inquisitorial Checking of Jurisdiction 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution makes clear that federal courts 
only possess limited jurisdiction, unlike the broad common law 
jurisdiction of the state courts.160 The “Cases” and “Controversies” 
limitations in Article III of the United States Constitution limits the 
role of the federal courts to deciding actual cases presented by parties 
with real injuries and, therefore, prevents federal judges from acting 
on their own initiative “to review and revise legislative and executive 
 
154. Kessler, supra note 147, at 1202–10. 
155. See Milani & Smith, supra note 153, at 272–86 (arguing that judicial 
sua sponte decisions are inconsistent with the adversarial nature of 
American courts).  
156. See id. at 282–86 (“The adversary system’s commitment to party 
control of litigation . . . preserves individual autonomy and dignity by 
allowing a person the freedom to make his case to the court.”). 
157. Emerson, supra note 147, at 1054–57; Kessler, supra note 147, at 1203–04. 
158. Emerson, supra note 147, at 1056–57, 1057 n.71; Kessler, supra note 147, 
at 1208–10. 
159. Kessler, supra note 147, at 1224–33. 
160. Collins, supra note 90, at 1836–38. 
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action.”161 Accordingly, federal courts may not issue advisory opinions 
about matters not presented by parties in a real legal dispute.162 
Because federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court recognized early in its history that federal courts could raise 
the issue of federal jurisdiction sua sponte.163 Professor Collins, 
however, has persuasively shown that federal courts before 1875 
primarily relied on the jurisdictional facts alleged in the pleadings to 
establish jurisdiction and usually relied upon the parties to raise 
jurisdictional questions.164 Furthermore, before 1875, federal courts 
often followed common law pleading rules that complicated and 
obscured when parties or courts could challenge or reconsider 
pleadings that falsely suggested the parties had federal jurisdiction, 
for example, by pleading diversity of state citizenship that was in fact 
not true.165 Professor Collins explains that common law pleading rules 
contained strong disincentives to challenging federal jurisdiction: 
Common-law pleading requirements discouraged objections to 
jurisdiction when it had been properly alleged. At common law, 
a party who raised a plea in abatement requiring the resolution 
of a disputed issue of jurisdictional fact would automatically 
lose on the merits if he lost on the motion. . . . Thus, the 
parties—who, often more than the courts, were the primary 
guardians of the limits of the federal courts’ jurisdiction—faced 
disincentives to objecting to jurisdiction even when they might 
otherwise have been so inclined. Only if the jurisdictional 
 
161. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009); see also supra 
Part I.A (discussing separation of powers and standing). 
162. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340–41 (2006); FEC v. 
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (“[A] plaintiff [is prevented] from 
obtaining what would, in effect, amount to an advisory opinion.”). 
163. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hand, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 573, 584 (1849) (“If the 
matter of abatement be . . . intrinsic, the court will act upon it upon 
motion, or notice it of themselves.”); Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. 
(8 Pet.) 148, 149 (1834) (dismissing a case on jurisdictional grounds, 
despite an apparent lack of any objection from the parties); Capron 
v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804) (“[I]t was the 
duty of the Court to see that they had jurisdiction, for the consent 
of parties could not give it.”); Turner v. Bank of N.-Am., 4 U.S. 
(4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799) (“[T]he fair presumption is (not as with regard 
to a Court of general jurisdiction, that a cause is within its 
jurisdiction unless the contrary appears, but rather) that a cause is 
without its jurisdiction till the contrary appears.”); Collins, supra 
note 90, at 1836–38 (describing Capron). 
164. Collins, supra note 90, at 1831–33, 1838–61 (discussing pre-1875 federal 
jurisdiction practices). 
165. Id. at 1838–44. 
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objection presented a question of law, as opposed to fact, could 
such harsh results be avoided.166 
By enacting The Judiciary Act of 1875,167 (“1875 Act”) Congress 
sought to eliminate the common law pleading rules that prevented 
federal courts from dismissing cases in which jurisdiction was 
established through false pleadings.168 Section 5 of the 1875 Act stated 
that a federal court “shall dismiss” a suit “at any time” after being 
filed in or removed to federal court when “it shall appear to the 
satisfaction of [the] court” that the suit “does not really and 
substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the 
jurisdiction of [the] court, or that the parties . . . have been 
improperly or collusively made or joined.”169 The Supreme Court 
interpreted section 5 as follows: “[U]nder the act of 1875, the trial 
court is not bound by the pleadings of the parties, but may, of its 
own motion, if led to believe that its jurisdiction is not properly 
invoked, inquire into the facts as they really exist.”170 Because 
section 5 of the 1875 Act authorized federal courts to dismiss a case 
at “any time” it became clear that federal jurisdiction was lacking, 
federal courts became more willing to dismiss a case at any time 
during the proceedings, even if traditional common law procedures would 
not have allowed them to do so after the initial pleadings were filed.171 
Despite language in the 1875 Act that federal courts had the 
authority to address jurisdictional defects “at any time,” federal 
courts for many years disagreed over which party had the burden of 
establishing or disproving jurisdiction if the plaintiff properly pleaded 
good jurisdiction facts.172 Only in 1936, in McNutt v. General Motors 
Acceptance Corp.,173 did the Supreme Court conclude that the 1875 
Act placed the burden on the party asserting jurisdiction to prove its 
 
166. Id. at 1841.  
167. Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. 
168. Collins, supra note 90, at 1861–62.  
169. § 5, 18 Stat. at 472; see also Collins, supra note 90, at 1861 (indicating 
that section 5 was “potentially applicable to all jurisdictional categories 
of cases filed in the federal courts”). 
170. Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 120 (1898); see also Collins, supra 
note 90, at 1862 (indicating that the Wetmore Court’s explanation of 
section 5 presented an “altogether new” possibility). 
171. See Collins, supra note 90, at 1868–70 (describing how the Supreme 
Court adopted an “inflexible rule” to dismiss pending cases for lack of 
jurisdiction). 
172. Id. at 1870–72. 
173.  298 U.S. 178 (1936). 
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allegations of jurisdictional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.174 
Additionally, the McNutt Court clearly stated that federal courts 
could sua sponte challenge the plaintiff’s alleged jurisdictional facts, 
although the defendant in that case had contested the plaintiff’s 
allegation that the amount of money in controversy was sufficient to 
meet the then-required jurisdictional amount.175  
In the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h) endorsed 
the McNutt approach by stating that a district court “shall dismiss” 
an action “whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or 
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter.”176 
On the other hand, the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure merged law and equity in federal procedure and, in doing 
so, eliminated many of the inquisitorial elements still remaining in 
equity law.177 Thus, while the 1938 Rules were based on a generally 
adversarial approach, they allowed courts a limited inquisitorial 
function in reviewing federal jurisdiction. 
C. Modern Federal Courts: A Trend Toward Limiting Jurisdictional 
Inquisitorialism 
Contemporary civil litigation in the United States and the United 
Kingdom remains primarily adversarial but may include some 
inquisitorial aspects.178 U.S. federal courts usually follow the 
 
174. Id. at 189 (“If his allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his 
adversary in any appropriate manner, he must support them by 
competent proof . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also 
Collins, supra note 90, at 1872 n.191 (pointing out that “the Court 
noted that the failure to make such an objection would not prevent the 
court from demanding proof by a preponderance of the evidence”). 
175. McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189 (“[W]here [jurisdictional facts] are not so 
challenged [by his adversary] the court may still insist that the 
jurisdictional facts be established or the case be dismissed, and for that 
purpose the court may demand that the party alleging jurisdiction 
justify his allegations by a preponderance of evidence.”); see also 
Collins, supra note 90, at 1872–73 (discussing McNutt). 
176. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) (1938) (current Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)); 
see also Collins, supra note 90, at 1873 (providing that Rule 12(h) 
“confirmed” the “implications” of McNutt). 
177. See Emerson, supra note 147, at 1054–60 (describing the reduced 
rules of masters); Kessler, supra note 147, at 1233, 1242, 1251–52 
(noting the elimination of out-of-court testimony and describing the 
creation of the trial master). 
178. See Robert Thomas, From ‘Adversarial v Inquisitorial’ to ‘Active, 
Enabling, and Investigative’: Developments in UK Administrative 
Tribunals, in The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in 
Administrative Regimes: Global Perspectives 52, 52–53 (Laverne 
Jacobs & Sasha Bagley eds., 2013) (observing most civil and criminal 
litigation in the United Kingdom is still largely adversarial). 
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adversarial system by relying on the parties to present facts and raise 
arguments for decision.179 But some specialized state courts for small 
claims, family matters, or juvenile issues use less formal and less 
adversarial approaches.180 Moreover, some administrative tribunals 
may use a combination of adversarial and inquisitorial methods to 
hasten the pace of adjudication and encourage settlements, or they 
may allow administrative judges to assist unrepresented litigants who 
lack the resources to hire expensive attorneys.181 
Nevertheless, despite any possible trend in federal administrative 
proceedings to use inquisitorial methods,182 Article III courts remain 
primarily adversarial, although they occasionally exercise inquisitorial 
powers when they make sua sponte decisions regarding jurisdictional 
issues.183 But the Supreme Court, through its trend to limit the issues 
 
179. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011) 
(“Under [our adversarial] system, courts are generally limited to 
addressing the claims and arguments advanced by the parties.”); Castro 
v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our 
adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know 
what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and 
arguments entitling them to relief.”). 
180. Cf. Thomas, supra note 178, at 51 & n.2 (explaining that small claims, 
family, and children’s courts in the United Kingdom are less formal and 
adversarial than other civil litigation). 
181. For example, in the United States, Social Security Disability benefit 
hearings, which entail large numbers of applicants and cases, contain a 
mixture of adversarial and inquisitorial elements, but there is no adverse 
party—no one appears for the government to argue for denial of 
benefits, and a federal administrative judge has the duty to assist the 
applicant in making his case. Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn 
and Byse’s Administrative Law 317–18 (11th ed. 2011). By contrast, 
enforcement proceedings by administrative agencies in administrative 
hearings are usually much more adversarial. Id. at 308, 331–32. In the 
United Kingdom, administrative hearings involve both adversarial and 
inquisitorial aspects, with some tribunals being closer to one end of the 
spectrum than the other, but there is a trend to allow administrative 
judges to assist unrepresented litigants. See Thomas, supra note 178, at 
56–62 (discussing the pressures for and against active litigation). 
182. Strauss et al., supra note 181, at 331–332. 
183. See Dodson, supra note 76, at 1444–45 (arguing federal courts exercise 
inquisitorial sua sponte authority in deciding jurisdiction issues but treat 
nonjurisdictional issues as within control of adversarial parties); Milani & 
Smith, supra note 153, at 247–50 (arguing the American legal system is 
primarily adversarial but that courts exercise inquisitorial sua sponte 
authority in deciding certain issues such as jurisdiction); Barry A. Miller, 
Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an 
Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1253, 1279–88 (2002) 
(discussing types of cases and circumstances where Article III courts make 
sua sponte decisions); see also Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 
(2006) (“A statute of limitations defense . . . is not ‘jurisdictional,’ hence 
courts are under no obligation to raise the time bar sua sponte.”) 
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that are considered jurisdictional,184 has gradually sought to limit 
jurisdictional exceptions to party control of litigation. In particular, in 
Gonzalez v. Thaler,185 the Supreme Court recently declared, “[W]e 
have pressed a stricter distinction between truly jurisdictional rules, 
which govern ‘a court’s adjudicatory authority,’ and nonjurisdictional 
‘claim-processing rules,’ which do not.”186 And previously, the Court, 
in Kontrick v. Ryan,187 had explained the distinction between truly 
jurisdictional rules and nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules by 
stating that “[c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used 
the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only for 
prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter 
jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a 
court’s adjudicatory authority.”188 Thus, the Supreme Court’s trend to 
reduce the issues considered jurisdictional attempts to limit the 
inquisitorial exceptions to party-controlled litigation in federal courts 
and adhere to the traditional adversarial practices of American courts. 
D. The Case for Adversarial Party Control and Treating Prudential 
Standing as Nonjurisdictional 
This Part argues that prudential standing should be considered 
nonjurisdictional for several reasons. First, such treatment would be 
consistent with the principle of adversarial party control, which 
supports the dignity of parties and, regardless if it is the only or best 
way of obtaining the truth, is the norm accepted by the Supreme 
Court. Second, based on an analysis of recent Supreme Court dicta, 
prudential standing is not so entwined with Article III standing such 
that it should automatically be treated similarly, that is, as 
jurisdictional. Finally, practical reasons regarding the entanglement of 
prudential issues and merits questions suggest that prudential 
standing, or at least most aspects of prudential standing, would be 
best treated as nonjurisdictional. 
The Anglo-American legal system is based on party control of 
litigation, and the justification for party control is grounded in the 
broad principle that each individual litigant should have the freedom 
 
(emphasis omitted); id. at 213 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have 
repeatedly stated that the enactment of time-limitation periods such as 
that in §2244(d), without further elaboration, produces defenses that are 
nonjurisdictional and thus subject to waiver and forfeiture.”). 
184. See supra Part III.A. 
185.  132 S. Ct. 641 (2012). 
186. Id. at 648 (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)). But see 
Hawley, supra note 105, at 23–54 (criticizing the recent trend by the 
Supreme Court to narrow scope of jurisdictional issues). 
187. 540 U.S. 443 (2004). 
188. Id. at 455. 
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and dignity to make litigation decisions instead of being directed what 
to do by a paternalistic inquisitorial judge.189 In Henderson ex rel. 
Henderson v. Shinseki,190 the Supreme Court addressed 
jurisdictionality and its impact on the role of parties in a lawsuit: 
This question [of a procedural rule’s jurisdictionality] is not 
merely semantic but one of considerable practical importance for 
judges and litigants. Branding a rule as going to a court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction alters the normal operation of our adversarial 
system. Under that system, courts are generally limited to 
addressing the claims and arguments advanced by the parties. 
Courts do not usually raise claims or arguments on their own.191 
Emphasizing the role, and implied dignity, of parties in the 
American legal system, Justice Scalia has stated, “Our adversary 
system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is 
best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and 
arguments entitling them to relief.”192  
With regard to the best strategy for establishing the truth in a 
particular case, adversarial and inquisitorial systems illustrate 
differing views. Proponents of adversarial judicial systems typically 
argue that party advocates are more likely to establish the true facts 
of a case than an inquisitorial judge who has no personal stake in the 
litigation other than professional duty.193 By contrast, the French 
inquisitorial system is premised on the opposite view that judges and 
other judicial employees are better suited to finding the truth than 
interested parties and that, accordingly, judges must carefully control 
any attempt at investigation or questioning of witnesses by the 
parties.194 Even if one might question the Anglo-American legal 
system’s premise that party-controlled litigation is better at finding 
facts than inquisitorial judges, our Anglo-American legal tradition is 
based upon party control of litigation and requires judges to act in a 
neutral and relatively passive role compared to European inquisitorial 
judges.195 
The Henderson decision demonstrates that the current Supreme 
Court believes that party control of the arguments and evidence in a 
 
189. See id. at 282–86 (“The adversary system’s commitment to party 
control of litigation . . . preserves individual autonomy and dignity by 
allowing a person the freedom to make his case to the court.”). 
190.  131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011).  
191. Id. at 1202 (citations omitted). 
192. 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
193. Milani & Smith, supra note 153, at 273–75. 
194. See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.  
195. Milani & Smith, supra note 153, at 279–82. 
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case is the “normal operation of our adversarial system.”196 By 
contrast, the decision makes clear that jurisdictional decisions are an 
inquisitorial exception to our adversarial tradition that should be 
invoked only when Article III courts must fulfill their “independent 
obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their 
jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional 
questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.”197 
Accordingly, the Henderson Court concluded, “We have urged that a 
rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a 
court’s adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal 
jurisdiction. Other rules, even if important and mandatory, we have 
said, should not be given the jurisdictional brand.”198 The Henderson 
decision is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent trend to limit 
jurisdictional exceptions to party control of litigation.199 The 
Henderson Court, however, does not directly answer whether 
prudential standing should be jurisdictional. 
While this Article argues that prudential standing, for the most 
part, is nonjurisdictional, the author must concede that the Supreme 
Court’s definition and treatment of prudential standing issues is 
complicated200 and that there is a plausible argument for treating 
prudential standing, or many aspects of prudential standing, as 
jurisdictional. The strongest argument for treating prudential 
standing as jurisdictional is the suggestion by the Warth Court that 
prudential standing doctrine is critical in constraining federal courts 
from addressing political questions that are better left to the political 
branches.201 But Warth did not directly address whether prudential 
standing is jurisdictional and therefore is not binding precedent on 
that issue. And while not directly questioning Warth, the subsequent 
Allen decision suggested that Article III constitutional standing is 
more important than prudential standing in deciding federal 
jurisdiction.202 Furthermore, while the Court has never overruled or 
 
196. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 1202–03 (citations omitted). 
199. See supra Part III.A. 
200. See supra Part I.B–C. 
201. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“Without such 
limitations—closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters 
of judicial self-governance—the courts would be called upon to decide 
abstract questions of wide public significance even though other 
governmental institutions may be more competent to address the 
questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to 
protect individual rights.”). 
202. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); see also Alliance for Envtl. 
Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) 
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questioned its decision in Warth, more recent Court decisions have 
clearly sought to narrow the scope of which issues are jurisdictional.203 
It is possible to reconcile Warth and more recent decisions such as 
Henderson or Gonzalez by treating prudential standing as 
nonjurisdictional but still giving prudential considerations significant 
weight when a court considers whether to dismiss a case after 
reviewing the merits. 
But unlike fundamental Article III standing, most, if not all, 
aspects of prudential standing are not so directly related to the core 
question of defining the limited jurisdiction of federal courts to 
demand an inquisitorial exception to the normal rule of party control. 
As the Allen Court suggested, there are substantial differences 
between constitutional Article III standing and prudential standing 
that are relevant to whether each should be treated as jurisdictional. 
Thus, because Article III standing doctrine raises stronger separation 
of powers issues than prudential standing, it is more appropriate for 
federal courts to prohibit consideration of the merits if a suit violates 
fundamental Article III requirements than discretionary prudential 
limitations. Furthermore, because Congress may statutorily waive 
prudential standing principles but not Article III standing 
requirements,204 courts should treat these principles as less 
fundamental and thus less jurisdictional than Article III requirements. 
Finally, it is sometimes necessary and appropriate for a court to 
consider merits questions before deciding prudential standing issues, 
even if one agrees with Steel Co. that a federal court may never 
consider the merits before deciding Article III standing jurisdiction.205 
The view that one may decide prudential questions along with the 
merits is even consistent with the Tenet Court’s suggestion that 
prudential standing is a “threshold question” that “may be resolved 
before addressing jurisdiction” because, as Judge Kavanaugh suggests, 
prudential standing is not a jurisdictional issue and therefore may be 
decided when it is most convenient for the court, unlike a 
jurisdictional issue that must be decided before considering the 
 
(discussing the Allen Court’s implication that Article III standing is 
more important than prudential standing). 
203. See supra Part III.A. 
204. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (“Prudential 
principles . . . unlike their constitutional counterparts . . . can be 
modified or abrogated by Congress.”). 
205. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102 (1998); see 
also notes 107–08 and accompanying text (discussing the entanglement 
of issues of fact with jurisdiction questions and the resulting discretion 
available to courts in resolving jurisdiction). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 2·2013 
Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional? 
453 
merits.206 Accordingly, because prudential standing issues are often 
better evaluated at the end of the case after a court has reviewed the 
merits of the case, it is better to treat prudential standing as a 
nonjurisdictional issue, despite the implication from Warth that 
prudential standing should be treated similarly to Article III standing. 
And as is mentioned in Part II.B, the Supreme Court could reclassify 
some prudential standing issues as going to Article III standing if the 
Court reasoned that a certain standing issue should be treated as a 
jurisdictional question that must be decided before the merits.  
Conclusion 
The strongest argument for treating prudential standing questions 
as jurisdictional is the suggestion by the Warth Court that prudential 
standing doctrine is crucial to constraining federal courts from 
addressing political questions better left to the political branches. The 
Warth Court suggested that prudential standing issues are similar in 
some ways to Article III issues, but it did not directly address the 
jurisdictionality of prudential standing. In Allen, however, the Court 
suggested that Article III standing—as a “core component” of 
standing “derived directly from the Constitution”—is more important 
than prudential standing doctrines.207 While the Allen Court did not 
directly address the jurisdictionality of prudential standing, its 
suggestion that prudential standing is less important than Article III 
standing supports the argument that prudential standing could be 
treated differently than Article III standing, that is, nonjurisdictional.  
A Harvard Law Review student commentary’s proposal to use 
separation of powers principles to treat prudential standing as 
nonjurisdictional and selectively allow the executive branch to waive 
prudential standing barriers in some cases but not others is intriguing, 
but the proposal would present serious implementation problems. In 
some cases, the executive branch has sound grounds to seek a swift 
decision on the merits and to avoid delays caused by the prudential 
standing doctrine. In other cases, the executive branch might waive 
the doctrine to obtain a decision that contravenes congressional policy 
or intent. The commentary’s proposal to give judges the discretion to 
decide when an executive waiver of the prudential standing doctrine 
either comports with or contravenes congressional intent raises too 
many difficult problems of interpretation. Instead of having courts 
engage in difficult line drawing between executive actions arguably 
favored or disfavored by the complex issue of congressional intent, it 
 
206. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 1, 6 n.4 
(2005)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013). 
207. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
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would be better to give parties the freedom to waive prudential 
standing barriers based on the fundamental principles of party-
controlled adversarial litigation.  
The greatest weakness of Judges Kavanaugh’s and Silberman’s 
opinions is that they did not thoroughly address why the Court has 
sought to narrow the range of jurisdictional issues. The argument for 
limiting the scope of jurisdictional rules would have been more 
convincing if it had also pointed out that sua sponte jurisdictional 
decisions by judges are generally contrary to the party-controlled 
adversarial model of legal decision making in the Anglo-American 
legal tradition. This connection has been acknowledged by the Court 
in its best explanation for making a sharp distinction between 
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules: “[b]randing a rule as going 
to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction alters the normal operation of 
our adversarial system.”208 While a close issue, prudential standing 
questions are less crucial to fundamental separation of powers 
concerns than Article III constitutional standing questions and 
therefore can be left to the parties to raise as part of the “normal 
operation of our adversarial system.”209  
Additionally, as it did in Lexmark, the Supreme Court could 
reclassify some prudential standing issues as going to Article III 
standing if the Court reasoned that a certain standing issue should be 
treated as a jurisdictional question. If it addresses which types of 
prudential standing issues are either jurisdictional or 
nonjurisdictional, the Court should do a better job of properly 
distinguishing between prudential and Article III issues and even 
providing a better rationale for its entire doctrine of standing. 
Moreover, if the issue of whether a prudential issue is jurisdictional or 
nonjurisdictional is a close question, courts should consider the 
fundamental principle of adversarial party control as a tiebreaker. 
  Finally, the Windsor Court did not specifically address whether 
prudential standing is jurisdictional, but it implied that the Court 
could treat its rules as nonjurisdictional at its convenience. Because 
the Windsor majority seemingly had a strong interest in resolving the 
merits of DOMA’s legality—despite the problem that the executive 
branch sided with the challengers rather than defending the law—the 
Court appeared willing to allow an exception to satisfy standing 
difficulties. Accordingly, one may question whether the Court would 
be able to treat prudential standing as nonjurisdictional outside the 
specific facts of that case. Because the Court has denied certiorari in 
Grocery Manufacturers, scholars, attorneys, litigants, and lower court 
judges will have to wait for another case for the Court to specifically 
address the jurisdictionality of prudential standing. 
 
208. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
209. Id. 
